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Abstract
Personal Identication Numbers (PINs) are widely used as
an access control mechanism for digital assets (e.g., smart-
phones), nancial assets (e.g., ATM cards), and physical as-
sets (e.g., locks for garage doors or homes). Using semi-
structured interviews (n=35), participants reported on PIN
usage for dierent types of assets, including how users
choose, share, inherit, and reuse PINs, as well as behaviour
following the compromise of a PIN. We nd that memora-
bility is the most important criterion when choosing a PIN,
more so than security or concerns of reuse. Updating or
changing a PIN is very uncommon, even when a PIN is com-
promised. Participants reported sharing PINs for one type
of asset with acquaintances but inadvertently reused them
for other assets, thereby subjecting themselves to potential
risks. Participants also reported using PINs originally set
by previous homeowners for physical devices (e.g., alarm or
keypad door entry systems). While aware of the risks of not
updating PINs, this did not always deter participants from
using inherited PINs, as they were often missing instruc-
tions on how to update them. Given the expected increase
in PIN-protected assets (e.g., loyalty cards, smart locks, and
web apps), we provide suggestions and future research di-
rections to better support users with multiple digital and
non-digital assets and more secure human-device interac-
tion when utilizing PINs.
1 Introduction
Knowledge-based authentication (e.g., passwords or PINs)
is widely used as it is a well-tested technology and simple to
administer [39]. However, research suggests that there are
persistent challenges with password usability [7] and mem-
orability [16, 20]. Additionally, passwords are too cumber-
some to use for protecting certain classes of assets, such as
a car or garage door, which limits their utility.
∗A version of this paper is appears at the 2020 Annual Computer Se-
curity Applications Conference (ACSAC’20).
With the proliferation of technology, it is somewhat
ironic that passwords “stubbornly survive and reproduce
with every new website” [7]. Challenges with passwords
can lead to frustration among users. To address these lin-
gering concerns, several mobile and web apps now provide
PIN-based authentication as the default option [38]. Mi-
crosoft is also planning to remove the password option from
the Windows 10 login screen while keeping PIN as one of
the login options [35]. Loyalty cards also require PINs to re-
deem points, and a survey indicates that an average Cana-
dian participates in twelve loyalty programs, which is a 25%
increase over four years [32]. Keyless home locks require
PINs to authenticate, and their market is forecasted to reach
35 million units by 2027 [21]. As technologies requiring se-
curity in the form of PINs become more prevalent, it is criti-
cal to understand how people choose and manage PINs, not
just for digital and nancial assets, but for the wide array
of physical assets for which PINs are used.
In studying PIN management, we broadly categorize
PINs into three categories of protected assets: digital (e.g.,
to unlock digital devices or authenticate to mobile and
web apps), nancial (e.g., ATM cards or banking apps),
and physical (e.g., digital keypad based entry systems for
garages or homes). Researchers have explored PIN-based
authentication for nancial assets, notably Bonneau et al.
studied chip-and-PIN systems [8], as well as Wang et al.
studied the guessability of PINs as derived from leaked
password datasets [47].
We argue that a broader analysis of PIN usage needs con-
sideration for several reasons. First, dierent types of assets
may be subject to dierent types of attacks (e.g., smart-
phone PINs might be more susceptible to shoulder surf-
ing [14] than PINs used to protect physical assets), and
prevalent reuse across these categories may result in un-
desirable consequences and increased risks. Second, PINs
for certain types of assets may be more likely to be shared
(e.g., nancial vs. digital asset PINs with a family member),
and their careless reuse may result in unauthorized usage.
Third, physical PINs are more likely to be shared among
family members or by trusted individuals within their net-
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work, which leads to interesting issues surrounding selec-
tion of PINs.
Prior work has yet to focus deeply on ways to address
the broader considerations associated with PIN usage from
a user perspective. In this study, we aim to investigate
how users create, manage, and share PINs across dier-
ent types of assets. To this end, we conducted hour-long,
semi-structured interviews with 35 participants. We chose
a semi-structured methodology to unpack and better un-
derstand the themes relating to use of PINs. Our ndings
include:
• When selecting a PIN, participants were more likely to
prioritize memorability of the PIN over security. While
participants reported that reusing a PIN was a low fac-
tor in selecting a PIN for a given asset, the majority
of participants (28/35 or 80%) reported reusing PINs.
This reuse was across dierent asset types and often
resulted in PINs for physical devices (e.g., bike lock)
moving into the digital world and vice versa.
• Despite more than two-thirds (71%) of our participants
describing situations where their PINs were compro-
mised, less than half of those (45%) reported updating
their PINs. This can be attributed in part to concerns
relating to memorability and usability of PINs.
• PIN update is very uncommon, overall, and when it
does occur, it is often due to reasons of security or
memorability (26/49 of reported PIN updates). How-
ever, for physical assets such as garage doors, a lack
of update may be due to the nature of these devices.
Six out of nine owners of PIN-protected garage doors
reported that they were unable to update their PIN as
they did not know how to perform this action, despite
desiring to do so.
• Dierences between asset types inuence the secu-
rity measures adopted by users. Participants were less
worried about compromising their physical PINs com-
pared to digital PINs, as potential attackers breaking
into an entity protected by a physical PIN may face
criminal prosecution, e.g., breaking and entering, de-
spite the fact that digital or nancial PINs can also lead
to personal, nancial, or criminal harm.
Based on our ndings, we propose three areas for further
exploration. First, new intervention and strategies for as-
sisting users in selecting and recalling PINs would address
many of the observed shortcomings. While password man-
agers are an obvious solution, their usage is mostly focused
on dierent types of accounts. However, current password
managers could be augmented to assist these tasks. Second,
as PINs become more pervasive, users may become more
concerned with the threat of shoulder surng attacks. To
counteract, the research community should focus on devel-
oping new tools to assist users in identifying instances of
shoulder surng, and provide guidance on mitigation prac-
tices. Finally, given the plethora of PIN usage scenarios,
unifying methods for updating PINs, similar to how pass-
word changing has mostly stabilized around standard prac-
tice, would make a dierence in encouraging PIN updates
after compromise. Of course, for physical assets, this is not
a simple task. Perhaps augmented reality tools could be
used to address this gap in the future, to link these physical
assists to known documentation.
2 Related Work
In this section, we explore related work in areas including:
PIN choices for human-chosen PINs, attacks on PINs, mem-
orability and reusability of PINs, and lifecycle and manage-
ment of authentication credentials in general. We also com-
pare and contrast our ndings for specic topics related to
PIN usage with ndings for other authentication methods
in Section 5.
2.1 Human-Chosen PINs
Users face several choices when choosing their authentica-
tion secrets. Selection is often inuenced by factors such
as memorability of the chosen secret, reuse of an existing
secret, usability (including time to authenticate and error
rates), and security [7, 11, 41]. Von Zezschwitz et al. [46]
have explored users’ choices for text-based password com-
position, while Biddle et al. [5] have summarized research
that explores users’ choices of graphical passwords. PINs
are less complex than text-based passwords [26] and dier-
ent from graphical passwords since PINs require memoriz-
ing digits.
Amitay collected PINs surreptitiously from an iPhone
app in the App Store. Their data showed that ten of the
most commonly used 4-digit PINs represented 15% of all
PINs in use [3]. Furthermore, most of these PINs followed
simple patterns of repeating or consecutive digits. In a
seminal work, Bonneau et al. [8] explored the user selection
preferences for bank card PINs (e.g., chip-and-PIN systems)
using survey data and approximated PINs from leaked
password data and Amitay’s dataset. They found that an
attacker who comes into the possession of a lost wallet
with a bank card and owner’s ID in it has about an 8%
chance of guessing the correct PIN due to the widespread
use of birthdays for PINs. Wang et al. [47] compared
characteristics (guessability, entropy, and distribution) of
chosen 4-/6-digit PINs between English and Chinese users.
Among other ndings, they showed that the top 5-8% most
popular PINs account for over 50% of PIN datasets. Markert
et al. [33] collected data on 4-/6-digit PINs, also nding
high prevalence of popular PINs, and that the benet of
using 6-digit PINs is minimal (or worse) than a 4-digit PIN.
Concurrent to this research, Casimiro et al. [10] conducted
an MTurk survey to study PIN choices and reuse and
conrm our ndings. While these studies oer an insight
into the prevalent reuse and not-so-secret nature of human
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PIN choice, our research extends prior work by examining
users’ motivations behind their choices.
2.2 Attacks on PINs and Defences
A range of studies have focused on the development and
evaluation of novel interaction techniques to defend against
shoulder surng attacks [12, 13, 15, 31, 45]. Researchers
have also explored novel side channel-based attacks on PIN
authentication, but these attacks require special equipment
or skillful attackers [1, 19, 48]. Since these eorts are only
tangentially related to our work, we discuss more related
works that study attacks and the recourse of victims.
Aviv et al. [4] and Khan et al. [28], empirically evalu-
ated the success of shoulder surng attacks on PINs under
various conditions. De Luca et al. [14] found that German
ATM users reported a low incidence of PIN shielding dur-
ing ATM use. They also reported a signicant inuence of
factors such as distractions, physical hindrance, trust rela-
tionships, and memorability on security in PIN-based ATM
use. Harbach et al. [22] conducted an online survey and
eld study to understand users’ smartphone unlocking be-
haviour. Of users that use a lock code (including PIN and
graphical pattern users) for their smartphones, 65% were
not or mostly not concerned about a shoulder surng at-
tack on their code. Other related work includes the study
by Eiband et al. [18], who explored shoulder surng attacks
and defences during normal smartphone usage, without fo-
cusing on authentication.
Our work expands the existing body of knowledge by
exploring attacks on PINs, the defences that are employed,
and the recourse of users when they suspect that the attacks
are successful for various digital and non-digital assets.
2.3 Security and Memorability of PINs
In an attempt to encourage users to be more secure in their
authentication behaviour, researchers have explored meth-
ods to generate and help users memorize secure PINs. Kim
and Huh [29] found that using a blacklist policy of restrict-
ing around 200 commonly used PINs signicantly increases
the randomness (as measured using Shannon entropy, not
guessability [6]) of PINs without signicantly increasing
the memorability overhead. Findings from a study by Mark-
ert et al. [33] indicate that even small blacklists of disal-
lowed PINs can substantially improve the security (as mea-
sured using guessability) of user-chosen PINs against throt-
tled attackers. Schechter and Bonneau [41] proposed two
techniques to memorize secure PINs and conducted a study
to show that the proposed memorization techniques were
eective, thereby reducing the likelihood of writing down
the new PIN. Stanekova and Stanek [43] and Huh et al. [25]
also explored eective methods to generate and memorize
PINs. Our work explores memorability and usage issues
surrounding PINs without exploring users’ memorization
strategies, and our ndings provide further motivation for
the development of eective PIN memorization techniques.
Renaud and Volkamer [40] conducted an online study
to evaluate two PIN memorization assistance techniques.
While they reported no improvements in PIN memoriza-
tion due to the users not using the memorization aids, they
reported on the strategies people adopted for PIN memo-
rization and whether participants wrote down their PINs.
They also identied reasons why participants updated their
PINs. However, they did not specify the rate at which dier-
ent PIN changes occurred and for what reason. We conduct
a more holistic and broader investigation of these phenom-
ena. We categorize and quantify the reasons why partic-
ipants change PINs and report on instances when partici-
pants chose not to change their PINs after PIN compromise
for dierent asset categories.
2.4 Lifecycle of Authentication Credentials
Although the lifecycle and management of PINs have not
been subjects of much research (either in digital or non-
digital contexts), researchers have explored these topics for
passwords. Stobert and Biddle [44] investigated how users
managed their passwords through a series of interviews.
They reported that users ration their eorts to protect their
accounts best, and many users reuse passwords as well as
adjust them for dierent accounts. They also found that
people were willing to put more eort into the management
of accounts with higher perceived importance (i.e., bank ac-
count passwords). Hayashi and Hong [23] conducted a two-
week diary study to examine password usage of 20 users.
They collected data on the frequency and location of pass-
word use, and the use of password aids. Based on their nd-
ings, they provide suggestions to improve the password au-
thentication experiences of users.
As PIN-based authentication increasingly becomes one
of the default authentication options for digital, physical,
and nancial assets, it is important to understand PIN
lifecycle and management across dierent assets. Our
study is the rst of its kind to report a holistic view of the
lifecycle and management of PINs, thereby highlighting
interrelationships across PINs for dierent types of assets.
3 Study Design and Methodology
Design The aim of our study is to better understand
how individuals use PINs across a variety of assets.
However, there are several challenges to such holistic
explorations. First, users may not be attentive to how
their PIN management behaviour varies across dierent
assets. Therefore, we chose to conduct semi-structured
interviews, which allowed participants to speak openly
about their PIN management experiences. This format also
provides us with quantitative data, as well as enabled us
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to ask clarifying and follow-up questions in cases where
more detail is needed for qualitative analysis.
Second, collecting user-selected PINs, as used to access
a wide range of assets, can quickly become impractical due
to the many-to-many mapping between PINs that users em-
ploy and the dierent asset categories. Such a study, while
valuable, would be incredibly time consuming and perhaps
an error-prone task. Using semi-structured interviews al-
lows us to perform exploratory analysis on the topic with
respect to the types of assets protected by PINs and to in-
vestigate usage strategies. The ndings would provide a
greater awareness of exact PINs used in each asset class.
In developing our survey instrument, we initially con-
ducted a pilot study (n = 4) with participants from the rst
author’s department. These participants were invited to a
lab where they undertook a structured survey containing
questions related to their demographics, their self-reported
prociency with technology and computer security, and
whom they lived with (see Appendix A.1 for details). We
then asked participants to enumerate all the PINs that they
use, and then for each PIN, we inquired about selection
(when and how they went about choosing it), resources
it protects and the perceived sensitivity of each resource.
We then asked about the frequency of PIN entry, others
whom they shared that PIN with, and the perceived trust
in those individuals. We also asked about any attacks
that had been encountered and their recourse. Finally, we
asked participants questions applicable to all categories,
including sharing across categories, and PIN management
after they moved on from a relationship where they had
shared a PIN with another individual.
During the pilot, participants had to respond to the same
set of questions for up to seven PINs. As a result, they found
the survey instrument to be cumbersome, as some of the
questions felt unnecessarily repetitive. We addressed this
by redesigning our survey across four sections: a section
that contained questions that were independent of any as-
set category or were pertaining to all asset categories; and
three sections that contained the same set of questions for
each of the three asset categories. This enabled us to collect
qualitative data eectively for each PIN category without
fatiguing the participants.
From the pilot study, we also noted that users were using
multiple PINs in each category (e.g., multiple PINs for
multiple banking cards). In the updated survey, while we
collected information on how many PINs participants used
for each category and across how many assets, we asked
participants to respond to our category-specic questions
(i.e., PIN choice sharing, reuse, and security-related as-
pects) for the most used PIN in each category. While this
design choice may have resulted in losing some valuable
information, it also supported our objective of collecting
high-quality data without losing participants’ interest due
to unnecessary repetition.
The redesigned survey was conducted with a new group
Table 1: Participants’ demographics (*UD = Undisclosed)
n = 35
Gender
Female Male
17 18
Age (in years)
18–25 26–30 31–35 36–40 41–45 46–50 50+
8 4 5 6 6 1 5
Annual Household Income (× $1000)
>$15 $15–29 $30–49 $50–74 $75-99 $100–150 >$150 UD*
2 2 3 4 5 10 2 7
Highest Education Level
High School Undergraduate Graduate
17 6 12
Self Reported Prociency in Technology
Basic Intermediate Advanced
6 18 11
Self Reported Prociency in Security
Basic Intermediate Advanced
19 9 7
of pilot participants (n = 4). All participants completed the
surveys within an hour, a more acceptable time frame. The
researchers examined the data and found that the catego-
rization of questions across dierent categories provided
more meaningful insights into participants’ behaviour re-
garding the PIN lifecycle. Therefore, this improved survey
was employed for our main study (also provided in Ap-
pendix A.2).
Methodology We received approval from our ethics
board for this study. We recruited participants from a local
classied ad portal, yers posted around the local area, and
word-of-mouth advertising. Participants were oered $25
for their participation in an hour-long study conducted on
campus at the University of Guelph. They were informed
prior to participating in the interview, that they must not
reveal their actual PINs to the researchers.
Before the interview, we described digital asset PINs as
the PINs that are used to unlock digital devices or authenti-
cate to mobile and web apps. Digital assets enumerated to
participants included smartphones, laptops, personal com-
puters, online accounts, voicemail, gaming consoles, apps,
smart watches, thermostats, and other smart home devices.
While PINs to digital home locks or banking web or mobile
apps could be classied as digital PINs, we asked partici-
pants to categorize those as physical or nancial PINs, re-
spectively. Financial asset PINs were described as the PINs
that controlled access to nancial assets, including ATM
cards, loyalty cards, and banking websites or apps. Phys-
ical asset PINs were described as the PINs that controlled
access to physical assets, including electronic home locks,
home security systems, garage door openers, cars, and bike
or gym locks.
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Figure 1: Boxplot of age of oldest PIN currently in use.
Table 2: Statistics of 231 assets that were PIN-protected
Asset Total Mean Median Min Max
Digital 94 2.7 2 0 7
Financial 84 2.4 2 1 7
Physical 53 1.5 2 0 4
During the semi-structured interview, the researcher
rst asked about the number of PINs participants used and
the assets protected by these PINs. The researcher also
reminded participants about several assets that could be
PIN protected to ensure that participants did not forget
any PINs. The researcher then explained each of the three
categories of PINs, and provided examples of assets for
each category. The researcher then asked category-specic
and category-independent semi-structured interview ques-
tions.
Table 1 provides the demographic information of 35 par-
ticipants and shows their diversity in terms of age, socio-
economic group, education, and level of technology aware-
ness.
4 Results
We now present our ndings. For test statistics, a Pearson’s
Chi-Squared test was used to compare categorical data, and
a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was used to
compare Likert scale responses between asset groups [30].
For all tests, a 푝 < 0.05 critical value was used for statisti-
cal signicance. For multiple comparisons of the same data
category, we applied Bonferroni correction to 푝-values and
set the signicance cut-o at 훼/푛, where 푛 is the number
of multiple comparisons [24]. When reporting quotes from
participants to represent a theme, we identify the number
of participants who expressed that code and provide a rep-
resentative quote.
Table 3: Reported PIN entry frequency across asset classes.
Frequency Digital Financial Physical
Multiple times/day 21/32 (66%) 3/34 (9%) 10/25 (40%)
Daily 9/32 (28%) 11/34 (32%) 2/25 (8%)
Multiple times/week — 10/34 (29%) 9/25 (36%)
Weekly 2/32 (6%) 5/34 (15%) 2/25 (8%)
Multiple times/month — 1/34 (3%) 1/25 (4%)
Monthly — 4/34 (12%) 1/25 (4%)
4.1 PIN Usage
In total, 140 PINs were reportedly being used by our
participants, and per participant, the average number of
PINs in use is 4, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of
15. These PINs are used to control access to 231 assets. As
presented in Table 2, 94 (41%) assets are digital, 84 (36%)
are nancial, and 53 (23%) are physical.
Among the digital assets, participants primarily reported
PINs for securing their smartphones, voicemail accounts,
and laptops/PCs (32, 22, and 17 digital assets, respectively).
For nancial assets, participants reported using PINs for
banking (debit or credit cards) and other loyalty cards (66
and 16 nancial assets, respectively). Among physical as-
sets, participants reported using PINs for keypad entry sys-
tems for home (or security systems), garage doors, and dial
locks for bikes/gym lockers (17, 19, and 11, respectively).
Participants were asked to rate how important the se-
curity of their assets is to them on a scale of 1–5 (5 being
the most important) for each of the asset types. The me-
dian response was 5 all asset types. The mean responses
were 4.31, 4.71 and 4.23 for digital, nancial and physical
assets, respectively. A Kruskal-Wallis test indicated no sig-
nicant dierences between asset groups for the security
rating (퐻 (2) = 4.98, 푝 = 0.08).
The self-reported daily usage of PINs across each cate-
gory is provided in Table 3. Participants authenticated to
their digital assets more frequently than nancial or physi-
cal assets, 30/32 (94%) “Daily” or “Multiple times a day” vs.
14/34 (41%) and 12/25 (48%, respectively. While more partic-
ipants were using their PIN-protected nancial assets (e.g.,
bank cards) daily, they reported using more usable methods
of payment, such as NFC-based tap-to-pay.
We asked participants to report the current PIN that they
have been using for the longest period of time within each
category. Figure 1 shows the responses from all participants
as well as responses grouped into two age groups—18–35
years (n = 16) and 36+ years (n = 19). For all participants,
the median age of PINs for digital, nancial, and physical
assets was 5, 8.5, and 4.5 years, respectively. Six partici-
pants reported never changing a PIN across any category
since conguring those. As the sampled PIN ages were not
distributed normally, a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis one-
way analysis of variance test was used to compare PIN ages
between groups. However, this test provided no evidence
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Table 4: Reported reasons for 49 PIN updates
Digital Financial Physical
Reason for update n=22 n=18 n=9
Security (preventive) 5 7 3
Security (post-compromise) 3 5 1
Easy to remember 1 4 2
Forgot the PIN 3 1 1
Policy requirement 2 0 0
Impulse 1 1 0
Asset upgrade 7 – 2
to suggest that PIN age varied signicantly between asset
types (퐻 (2) = 2.94, 푝 = 0.23).
4.2 PIN Choices
We investigate the factors that motivate PIN choices by
asking participants to rank the importance of four crite-
ria when they are choosing PINs: security, memorability,
usability, and reusability. The normalized score (rescaled
to have values between 0 and 1) from the participants is
plotted in Figure 2. The ranking was normalized for better
comparisons between PIN choices of dierent asset types.
Figure 2 shows that memorability is the most important
factor for participants when they are choosing PINs across
dierent asset types. Security and usability (dened as "ease
to enter the PIN" for our participants to dierentiate from
memorability) were the next most important factors for the
participants. While participants reported reusing PINs (see
Section 4.5), they ranked reusability as the least important
factor for dierent asset types. The average ranks (1–4, 1
being most important) for memorability, security, usabil-
ity, and reusability across assets were 1.52, 2.25, 2.83, and
3.40, respectively. A Kruskal-Wallis test shows a statisti-
cally signicant dierence between the ranks chosen for
the four criteria (퐻 (3) = 130.93, 푝 < 0.01). Post hoc pair-
wise comparisons using Mann-Whitney U tests (Bonferroni
corrected) between ranks given by participants for each cri-
terion show statistically signicant dierences between all
six pairs of criteria (all 푝 < 0.001).
Interview scripts show that while participants ranked
reusability as the least important factor, participants were
reusing PINs for reasons of memorability.
“Its really annoying to have to remember a new PIN so I
change them all to the one I was using. I wouldn’t be able
to keep track of what PIN is for which card if I didn’t make
them all the same. I have ve cards that have PINs.” (P28)
4.3 PIN Update
For each asset category, we asked participants to recall the
last time they updated a PIN. Participants reported 49 inci-
dents of PIN changes (22, 18, and 9 for digital, nancial, and
physical assets, respectively). The number of reported PIN
updates diered signicantly between asset groups (휒2(2) =6.58, 푝 < 0.05).
Table 4 shows that 9/49 (18%) PIN updates across asset
types were due to the compromise of PINs. In Section 4.6,
we report our ndings that the majority of PIN compro-
mises do not result in a PIN update. Another 15/49 (31%)
PIN updates were performed as a preventive security
measure. The reasons for the update were similar to the
following:
“Yes, changed it because felt it was good to change. Because
its more secure to change it from time to time.” (P16)
Five of the seven participants who updated PINs of their
nancial asset did so to change the default PIN that was
set by the bank for security reasons.
12/49 (24%) of PIN updates were due to memorabil-
ity reasons—either motivated by participants’ decision to
choose easy to remember PINs or as a result of forgetting a
PIN.
“I have been using this PIN for various things for 30 years.
[I] set my devices to the same PIN when I get them.” (P31)
For digital assets, 7/22 (32%) PIN updates were a result of a
device (smartphone) upgrade. The reason for PIN updates
due to device upgrades are explored below. Other less com-
mon reasons included policy requirements and impulsive
updates.
Participants were asked to describe the strategy they
used to pick the new PIN for each of the PIN update
events, and we furthered queried participants about dier-
ent events that led to PIN updates. The codied responses
are reported in Figure 3, which shows that the most popular
strategies for selecting a new PIN are choosing an easy to
remember number or a signicant number, such as a date.
Other popular strategies included using numbers that rep-
resented a word or using a pattern on the keypad. 17/49
(35%) PIN update strategies were simply reported as an easy
to remember PIN. Since patterns or reused PINs are easy to
remember, it is not clear how many of these participants
were choosing patterns or reusing other PINs. We discov-
ered this confound during our analysis; therefore, for digi-
tal assets, we were unable to collect data on what prompted
participants to update PINs when they acquired a new de-
vice. However, the update strategies show that users em-
ployed approaches that result in better memorability (easy
to remember or represents a signicant number or word).
The two cases for physical asset upgrades are reported for
situations when participants moved to a new place and up-
dated PINs for digital locks.
It is interesting to note that signicant numbers and key-
pad patterns were popular PIN update strategies despite
the reason for update—whether it was security or memo-
rability. Insecure PIN selection strategies were prevalent in
high-risk scenarios:
“Yes, suspect my ex-girlfriend had it. I think she saw me
enter it in and I changed it after that. I added two digits to
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Figure 2: Participants’ ranking of security, memorability, usability, and reusability criterion for PINs choices in dierent
categories (lower rank indicates more important choice factor).
Figure 3: Participants’ reasons for PIN update (labels in the
center) and strategies for PIN updates (labels on the right).
the old one to make it a six digit PIN. I added a repeat two
digits to the end of the PIN” (P16)
4.4 PIN Sharing
Two factors that possibly inuence PIN sharing habits
include the type of asset (e.g., home lock vs. smartphone
PIN) and co-habitation. For the former, we separately
report the sharing habits for dierent asset types. For
the latter, we asked participants whom they lived with:
seventeen participants reported living with a spouse, seven
with roommates, four with a romantic partner, three with
parents, three with siblings, twelve with children, and two
by themselves.
The reported statistics for PIN sharing are provided in
Table 5. Only a few participants reported not sharing PINs
with anyone. For digital assets, only 6/32 (19%) participants
did not share their PINs. 21/32 (66%) participants shared
PINs for their digital assets with other people that they were
in a romantic relationship with. 9 (28%), 5 (16%), and 5
(16%) of the 32 participants shared their digital PINs with
children, friends, and siblings, respectively. Four partici-
pants reported sharing PINs of their digital assets because
they were in circumstances where they felt that they had
no other option but to share it temporarily. However, all of
Table 5: People that participants reported sharing PINs
with.
Digital Financial Physical
Shared with (n=32) (n=34) (n=27)
None 6 7 1
Spouse 16 17 13
Children 9 6 8
Parents 3 7 10
Siblings 5 2 5
Girl/Boyfriend 5 3 4
Friends 5 2 9
Helpers 0 0 8
them reported not updating PIN after sharing for trust or
other reasons:
“I had to share it withmy step-child once that I was driving.
I thought about changing it but not too keen on changing
it since new PINs are a hassle. He visits us once a week only
so that is also a factor.” (P26)
For nancial assets, 7/34 (21%) participants reported not
sharing their PINs with anyone. Participants mostly shared
their nancial asset PINs with their romantic partners
(20/34 (59%)) and parents (3/34 (21%)). Only two partici-
pants reported sharing with friends to grab lunch or cof-
fee for them. Similar to digital PINs, three participants re-
ported inadvertent sharing of nancial PINs and not updat-
ing them later.
“I have given it to my son once too to buy something and
was concerned if he would try the same on my laptop or
smartphone. Yes, he knows those PINs now [laptop and
smartphone PINs—the same as their ATM card] but back
then he didn’t. Was holding another kid and there was an
urgent need to grab water from convenience store.” (P24)
As expected, for physical assets, all but one participant
shared their PINs with at least one other party. Other
than prevalent sharing among friends and family mem-
bers, 8/27 (30%) participants reported sharing physical PINs
with hired helpers (cleaners or pet caretakers). For physical
PINs, two cases of inadvertent sharing with strangers were
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Table 6: Reported reuse of PINs
Have you reused PINs?
No: 7/35 (20%)
Yes: 28/35 (80%)
Type of reuse
18/28 across all asset types
3/28 same asset type only
4/28 across digital and physical
3/28 across digital and nancial
identied. Participants reported not updating the PIN, even
after their contact with the third parties had concluded. We
discuss the reasons for not updating physical PINs in Sec-
tion 5.
“Yes, it was shared with the furniture company that went
out of business, and nothing was done about it. Never had
a problem with the company so there is a trust.” (P11)
The self-reported sharing data on PINs from our study
shows widespread sharing as well as sharing across dier-
ent relationship types. Among participants that live with
their spouses, all but one (94%) shared their PINs for digi-
tal assets. For participants who reported living with a girl-
friend/boyfriend, all shared their digital PINs with their
partner. This nding is dierent from Kaye’s nding that
only a third or fewer participants reported sharing their
personal email and Facebook passwords, both primarily
with partners and close friends [27]. This dierence is ex-
pected because Kaye studied sharing habits for specic on-
line services whereas, participants from our study reported
sharing habits for assets that are either more likely to be
shared (e.g., physical) or assets that are more generic in na-
ture (e.g., smartphones). Our ndings are congruent with
those of Matthew et al. [34] and Singh et al. [42] that people
share passwords with trusted family members.
4.5 PIN Reuse
We asked participants whether they reuse PINs (within the
same or across asset categories). Seven (20%) participants
reported not reusing PINs at all for security reasons. These
seven participants used 1, 2, 3, 5, 5, 6, and 6 PINs in total.
Twenty-eight participants reported reusing PINs. As
discussed in Section 4.2, the reported underlying reason for
reuse was memorability. Out of these participants, 18 (64%)
reported reusing PINs across all categories. Three par-
ticipants reported reusing PINs within the same category
only (e.g., a common PIN for both their phone and tablet).
Findings also showed that three participants reported
reusing PINs across digital and physical categories, and the
same number reported reusing across digital and nancial
asset categories. Participants’ choice to not reuse PINs and
create new PINs for some assets was motivated to protect
against certain threats.
“[I have] shared PIN-A [(Cell phone, laptop, online account
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Figure 4: Participants reported attacks on PINs for dierent
asset categories.
Figure 5: Reported recourse by participants (labels on right)
against dierent attacks (labels in center) on PINs.
(cell provider))] and PIN-C [(Netix parental, xBox)] with
spouse and PIN-B with kids [(Home, Garage, tab)].” (P25)
During the interviews, several participants demonstrated
that they understood the risk of reusing PINs. However,
they either considered the reuse to be a secret or a chance
worth taking despite the risks involved.
“Well it is the same as my garage and alarm PIN. All -
nancial PINs are the same so I have shared it with my
wife, kids, dog walker, and cleaning lady but only my wife
knows it’s the same PIN for my bank.” (P28)
4.6 Attacks on PIN and Recourse
We asked participants to recall the last time a PIN in each
asset category may have been subjected to shoulder surng
or guessing attacks, regardless of the outcome of the at-
tacks. Figure 4 shows the distribution of participants who
perceive that an attack may have occurred on their PINs
of dierent categories. 25 participants (71%) recall experi-
encing a shoulder surng attack or being concerned that a
guessing attack had occurred on one or more of their PINs.
More participants reported attacks on PINs for digital and
nancial assets than for physical assets (26 and 17, respec-
tively vs. 8). Similarly, across all asset types, participants re-
ported more shoulder surng attacks than guessing attacks
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(37 vs. 14). The number of shoulder surng and guessing
attacks reported both diered signicantly between asset
types (휒2(2) = 7.74, 푝 < 0.05 and 휒2(2) = 6.84, 푝 < 0.05,
respectively). Signicantly more shoulder surng attacks
were reported for nancial assets than guessing attacks
(휒2(1) = 11.29, 푝 < 0.05).
We also asked participants regarding the recourse that
they took when they were subjected to attacks. Their re-
sponses were codied, and a summary of results is pre-
sented in Figure 5. For 23 of the potentially successful
attacks, participants reported taking no action to prevent
shoulder surng or guessing attacks across dierent asset
categories. The reasons reported for this inaction included
trusting the attacker (friend or family member), laziness, or
that the attack failed, so they felt action was not required.
“Yes, at work some colleagues have seen me enter it. Usu-
ally for meetings I have to open my device and enter PIN
in front of other people. I am not looking but can imag-
ine that every one who is next to me have seen it. Did not
change it and did not protect because it seems like people
would think that I do not trust them.” (P35)
Six participants reported updating PINs in response to an
attack—four for digital assets and two for nancial assets.
Note that when participants were asked about why they
updated a PIN (for a previous question, see Table 4), more
participants reported updating the PIN due to reasons of se-
curity. However, that over-reporting is due to compromises
through other types of attacks (e.g., online compromise of
a PIN-protected nancial asset). Other common defences
included covering the device screen or moving the screen
away from the attacker (similar to the nding of Eiband et
al. [18]).
5 Discussion
Our interviews uncovered interesting ways in which dif-
ferent asset categories can impact PIN management and
unique security and memorability challenges for PINs. In
this section, we discuss these issues. For qualitative anal-
ysis, two researchers independently performed thematic
analysis to identify themes from participant responses dur-
ing the semi-structured interview. Identied themes were
compared and discussed by reviewers until consensus was
reached. This approach is used by other researchers in the
eld (e.g., Acar et al. [2]).
5.1 PINs in Dierent Contexts
Our ndings show dierences between dierent asset types
in how participants share PINs and how PINs are attacked.
Participants also reported using dierent levels of protec-
tion for dierent types of assets. This behaviour was due
to dierent levels of perceived risk to dierent types of as-
sets and the possible recourse available to the users in case
the attacker was successful. For instance, ve participants
reported being less concerned about physical PINs than dig-
ital or nancial PINs and had comments similar to the fol-
lowing.
“Even if it was access to where the digital devices or money
[nancial] PINs are [through physical PINs], the risk of
breaking a physical PIN is higher for getting caught then
the other ones.” (P16)
Similar comments were from two participants who were
less concerned about other people learning their nancial
PINs.
“I would be a lot more concerned about someone accessing
my phone than my bank account. If a colleague were to
look into my phone or laptop I would not have a recourse
but if someone were to steal my money that will be a dif-
ferent thing.” (P35)
Two participants also reported caring less about their nan-
cial PINs because an attacker with their bank cards will be
able to perform transactions without needing the PIN.
“Not much [worried about PIN security] and I guess it is a
combination of factors. [Bank] card is on me and if some-
one were to get it they could tap-to-pay or do an online
transaction with the number on the back. And in that case
there is reimbursement for fraud.” (P35)
Only one participant reported being more concerned
about the physical PINs due to their perceived susceptibility
to shoulder surng attacks.
“Yes. I am worried someone would watch me enter it. They
may have binoculars. I always cover it [hand masking en-
try].” (P29)
The comments of participants indicate that with the
availability of possible recourse (i.e., police involvement for
physical or nancial assets), they were less careful about
the secrecy of their PINs. Egelman et al. [17] also reported
observing this rational behaviour for the use of security fea-
tures on smartphones and risk perceptions of users. How-
ever, while the perception that the attackers are less in-
clined to trespass on their property may be true, the major-
ity of participants reported reusing their PINs across other
categories.
5.2 Attack Susceptibility of PINs
In Section 4.6, we reported our nding that 27/35 (71%) of
participants reported attacks on PINs. Another interest-
ing theme that emerged from participants’ responses was
the high susceptibility of PINs to shoulder surng attacks.
Three participants voiced the concern that it is dicult to
enter a PIN without third parties in close proximity learn-
ing about it.
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“My colleagues may knowmy PIN but not too sure whether
it is worth changing it because they will learn the new one
too. Mostly this happens when you unintentionally look at
someone entering it.” (P24)
This observation was also the reason why two of the par-
ticipants did not update their PINs after they were compro-
mised.
“My kids are not supposed to know it but they must have
seen me enter it on my previous phone when I did not have
a ngerprint id. [...] I am not too sure who else has knows
it or has cared to learn it. I have seen many enter their
PINs and patterns before me but never cared for it.” (P33)
During the discussion on guessing attacks, the comments
of four participants seemed to indicate that they understood
that their PINs were weak and could be easily guessed.
“Didn’t ask how he [the perpetrator] got to know but I guess
he watched me type it or he may have guessed it since it
was simple enough.” (P25)
Participants’ comments show that they relied on other
measures to complement security oered by PINs. These
approaches include risk aversion of attackers against at-
tacking nancial and physical assets (discussed earlier),
aversion of attackers to be recorded in the act, and partici-
pants being careful of their assets around attackers:
“For the gym locker PIN, I am worried sometimes because
many people are around and I leave my wallet and phone
in the bag when going for shower. But there are cameras in
some areas so I think people would not try something silly.”
(P33)
Two participants complained about the PIN entry in-
terface for Netix Parental lock. These participants com-
plained that on big screens, the Netix parental lock did
not provide them with a way to enter the PIN without giv-
ing it away in shared spaces—particularly with the children
in the vicinity.
“[...] when my kids ask me to play specic content I’ve to
ask them to leave the room.” (P24)
The relative ease with which PINs can be shoulder surfed
is known [28]. Our study shows users are aware of this
issue, and that it negatively aects trust in PINs as an ef-
fective security control. We discuss some remediation in
Section 6.
5.3 Memorability Issues
As noted, participants rated memorability as the most im-
portant criteria for selecting PINs. This high ranking may
be attributed to avoiding potential inconveniences:
“You have to be really quick in restaurants or stores, you
can’t be guessing and trying to remember it. That’s why I
keep the same PIN.” (P32)
Memorability and ease of entering a known PIN seemed
to trump security even for the cases where participants de-
cided to update PINs. Three participants reported that they
reluctantly reverted their PINs because of frequent errors.
“Did change after [my girlfriend learned it] because we
were living in the same shared space but made so many
mistakes that I reverted; entry mistakes from muscle
memory” (P27)
Stobert and Biddle [44] found that users found coping
mechanisms to live with the diculties of password au-
thentication. Similarly, PIN users seem to be using strate-
gies to deal with the memorability-related challenges of PIN
authentication by compromising security. In Section 6, we
discuss some approaches to mitigate these memorability-
related challenges.
5.4 PINs and Past Relationships
Park et al. [37] conducted an online survey and found that,
among other factors, marriage and co-habitation results in
the sharing of online accounts. Our ndings are congru-
ent with theirs. Our participants self-reported wide-spread
sharing of PINs with their romantic partners.
Nine participants reported sharing their digital PINs with
someone that they were in a romantic relationship with in
the past. Three of these participants did not change the
PIN because they either still trusted that person or they felt
there was no need since the other person no longer had ac-
cess to assets (“[I] changed it just for more privacy but didn’t
feel the need to change it.” (P6)). Other participants updated
their PINs, although one participant reported that there was
no need to do so (“[Did] nothing as I had the device” (P3)).
One participant reported changing PIN because the other
person still cohabited with them.
For nancial assets, ve participants reported sharing it
with people that they were in a relationship in the past,
and only two people reported updating it. Note that these
participants also reported updating their digital PINs after
moving on. Only four participants shared their physical
PINs with past relationships, and only one reported updat-
ing it. While these PINs were for home or garage access,
participants reported not changing those because they still
trusted their past partner (Nothing was done as there was
never a problem. (P13)).
Park et al. [37] identied that individuals are likely to
attempt to remove or disable a partner’s access to online
accounts. We did not nd this to be the case for our par-
ticipants. Unlike with online accounts, participants would
need access to assets in addition to the authentication
secret (i.e., PINs). However, with the increasing number
of online services that accept PINs and the widespread
reuse, this may pose a threat to those accounts where PIN
has been reused. For such cases, it would be benecial
to consider the guidelines suggested by Obada-Obieh et
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al. [36] on design improvements of online accounts to
support users better when they end account sharing.
5.5 Physical PIN Inheritance and Update
One interesting nding was the “inheritance” of physical
PINs that protected garage doors. Nine participants
reported moving to another house with a pre-existing PIN
set to open the garage door, but only three participants
reported updating that PIN while the remaining six kept
the PIN set by the previous owner. One participant even
reported reusing the inherited PIN for their home lock:
“Garage [PIN was set] by previous owner. [I] used it again
for home lock that was installed afterwards” (P27)
Since four of these six participants reported changing the
home locks, the lack of the update of garage door PINs can-
not be attributed to trust. Instead, this insecure behaviour
is due to the lack of knowledge on how to update the PIN:
“No, the garage was setup by previous owner. We did
change the key locks and considered updating the garage
PIN but there is no information available on it on how to
do that.” (P34)
This inability to update garage door PIN was also voiced by
participants when these PINs were accidentally divulged:
“Once a person who was delivering a package [saw it]. My
husband was concerned about it but neither knew how to
change it.” (P35)
While the instructions on how to update these PINs were
missing, two participants did comment that laziness on
their part also contributed to the situation, and that they
had other resources available.
“[It was shared with the] Garage door repair person when
they were here to x the door. Didn’t change it... don’t
know how to although I can google [search].” (P26)
One participant complained that the previous owner did
not share the Master PIN that would allow a PIN update,
thereby eliminating their ability to update it. The inability
of users to eortlessly update PIN in case of a compromise
could potentially result in security issues. In Section 6, we
discuss possible remediation strategies.
6 Future Research Directions
PIN choices and management strategies. Our partic-
ipants reported widely sharing and reusing PINs, and in-
frequently changing them even after they were compro-
mised. The interviews indicate that the main driving fac-
tor behind this risky behaviour was the memorability of
PINs. Most participants did not adopt a PIN management
strategy by explicitly considering the threat actors. When
prompted to choose a PIN, they chose a PIN that they re-
membered well. Only a few participants considered aspects
such as the circles they had to share the PIN with before
choosing their PINs. Other factors that need to be con-
sidered include the nature of the asset, the susceptibility
of attacks on the asset (e.g., shoulder surng is more of a
threat for a smartphone than an ATM PIN), and the type
of recourse that is available to participants in the event of a
compromise. While these are important considerations, ad-
ditional research needs to be conducted to understand that
a user with an average technology and security prociency
is able to make secure PIN choices given these factors. This
will enable researchers to create improvements that actu-
ally match user expectations in their everyday lives.
PIN-based authentication is used for six assets on aver-
age and recalling the correct PIN for the right asset is prob-
lematic for several participants. Existing proposals on the
memorability of PINs (discussed in Section 2) do not im-
prove the situation with multiple assets and multiple PINs.
A cued recall-based approach that allows a participant to
associate pairs of assets and PINs (or corresponding word
representation of PINs) may oer mitigation. Digital wal-
lets, for example, enable users to perform secure transac-
tions without entering PINs, but such features are not avail-
able for all PINs, particularly physical PINs. Digital apps for
smartphones could be designed to help people with such re-
call issues with features similar to that of a password man-
ager but would enable quick recall for digital, nancial, and
physical PINs.
Condence in PINs as a security control. Prior empir-
ical studies report on the susceptibility of PINs to shoulder
surng attacks and users’ experiences of such attacks [4, 18,
22, 28]. We also uncovered the limited levels of faith users
reported on PINs’ resistance to shoulder surng attacks (see
Section 4.6). While simple defences like shielding the key-
pad while entering a PIN is eective, it is not widely used
as it shows the lack of trust to the observers. Improved
PIN entry interfaces have been proposed that provide de-
fences against shoulder surng (discussed in Section 2), but
the limited availability of these on smartphones may reduce
the ecacy of PINs as an eective security control. We also
noted several cases where participants had to inadvertently
share their PINs or enter PINs in front of other people. The
availability of a short-term device access approach like Sna-
pApp [9] may help users greatly improve the security pos-
ture of their digital PINs.
Improved interfaces for PIN update. PIN-based au-
thentication on devices with limited interfaces (e.g., garage
doors and digital home locks) introduces unique challenges.
Our study shows that users are more likely to continue in-
herited PINs for such assets due to the lack of clear and
readily available instructions on how to update PINs. Fur-
thermore, such assets may require a master PIN to update or
reset PINs, and the storage and management of such a PIN
further complicates the situation. One participant reported
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sharing the same PIN with people of dierent trust levels
with (e.g., family vs. pet caretaker) despite the availability
of the digital home lock to create dierent PINs. This was
primarily due to the inability of the device to report which
PINs were used when.
As the security of an asset is dependent on being able to
change the PIN in case of a compromise, there is a need to
design a standard way to update and reset PINs on devices
with limited interfaces (i.e., only keypad). Alternatively, in-
structions could be provided on the physical locks to reduce
barriers to PIN update on such devices. While the availabil-
ity of such unifying methods for updating PINs on future
devices would make a dierence in encouraging PIN up-
dates after compromise, the challenge will remain for mil-
lions of devices currently in use. One possible approach
is to design augmented reality tools to address this gap by
linking these physical assists to known documentation and
instructions for updating PINs.
7 Limitations
Our study has some inherent limitations similar to that of
other user studies, which include that many of the ndings
are based on self-reported data from willing participants.
Prior empirical studies of PIN usage on smartphones [22]
indicated that participants under-report their daily PIN us-
age, which may also be the same here. In which case, our
results may underestimate the total number of PINs used
across asset types, which is compounded by the fact that
some categories, such as banking app PINs, could be classi-
ed as both digital and nancial. In an attempt to mitigate
this limitation, we choose to use a semi-structured inter-
view method that included suggestions of assets, to help
ensure that participants thought of the diversity of assets
where PINs are used.
Additionally, we asked several contextual questions for
the most widely used PIN in each category. As a result, our
study is limited in scope with regard to the most widely
used PINs, but we were able to collect quality responses
from participants in a time-constrained lab-based study re-
garding the PINs that protect the most assets.
We were also limited geographically in our participant
pool, which belonged to the Waterloo and Guelph regions
in Canada. This is a relatively safe place to work and live
(as self-reported by the participants). The safe environ-
ment may have implicitly encouraged some of the unsafe
practices among our participants for PINs protecting their
physical assets. However, we do believe this convenience
sample does generalize to many other populations, but not
all, and more research would be needed to understand how
dierent populations approach PIN security.
Finally, interviews were conducted by two researchers
sequentially, where both researchers used the same semi-
structured script of questions. We found that the second
researcher elicited more detailed quotes from participants,
which are cited more throughout the document; however,
data collected by the rst researcher are still ecologically
valid and were fully used in data analysis.
8 Conclusion
We conducted a study with 35 participants to understand
how they manage PINs across dierent assets. Our ndings
show behaviour that may result in potential compromises
due to widespread sharing and reuse of PINs across dier-
ent asset categories were mainly motivated by reasons of
memorability. The memorability concerns also deter users
from updating PINs after they are compromised. Partici-
pants further reported their lack of condence in PINs due
to their susceptibility to shoulder surng attacks—a con-
cern that can be mitigated using PIN entry interfaces that
resist shoulder surng. Our study also shows that partici-
pants change their PIN management behaviour for dierent
types of assets due to the availability of another recourse in
case of a compromise. Finally, we propose further research
directions for researchers. With the increasing options to
use PINs for purposes of authentication for dierent types
of assets, our ndings will help researchers design tools and
strategies to improve the security of PIN-protected assets.
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Appendix
A Survey Material
A.1 Closed Response Demographic Ques-
tions
1. What is your age?
(a) 18-25; (b) 26-30; (c) 31-35; (d) 36-40; (e) 41-45; (f) 46-
50; (g) 50+ yrs; (h) Prefer not to answer
2. What is your identied gender?
(a) Male; (b) Female; (c) Non-binary; (d) Other; (e) Pre-
fer not to answer
3. What is your highest level of education?
(a) Some high school; (b) High school; (c) Some col-
lege/university; (d) Trade/technical/vocational train-
ing; (e) Associate’s degree; (f) Bachelor’s degree; (g)
Master’s degree; (h) Professional degree; (i) Doctorate;
(j) Prefer not to say
4. What is your annual household income?
(a) Under $15,000; (b) $15,000 – $29,000; (c) $30,000 –
$49,999; (d) $50,000 – $74,999; (e) $75,000 – $99,999; (f)
$100,000 – $150,000; (g) over $ 150,000; (h) prefer not
to answer
5. Which of the following best describes your educa-
tional background or job eld?
(a) I have an education in, or work in, the eld of com-
puter science, computer engineering or IT;
(b) I do not have an education in, nor do I work in, the
eld of computer science, computer engineering or IT;
(c) prefer not to answer
6. Which of the following best describes your level of
prociency with technology?
(a) Basic (I can perform basic tasks on a smart-
phone/laptop such as sending emails or browsing the
internet;
(b) Intermediate (I can perform intermediate tasks on
a smartphone/laptop such as changing the settings or
installing new applications);
(c) Advanced (I have knowledge of and am capable of
writing source code);
(d) Prefer not to answer
7. Which of the following best describes your level of
prociency with security?
(a) Basic (I have a limited understanding of security
i.e., does not know what antivirus is or does not know
how to use it);
(b) Intermediate (I have some knowledge on aspects
of security and dierent threats that exist and how to
remediate some of them);
(c) Advanced (I have some formal training or actively
researches security topics);
(d) Prefer not to answer
8. Can you identify which of these relationships types
apply to those you currently live with (choose all that
apply)?
(a) Alone; (b) Spouse; (c) Own children; (d) Parents; (e)
Siblings; (f) Friends; (g) Roommates; (h) Other (please
describe the relationship type); (i) Prefer not to answer
9. I live in an area that is: (5-point Likert scale “Very safe”–
“Very unsafe” )
10. I work or spend time in an area that is: (5-point Likert
scale “Very safe”– “Very unsafe” )
A.2 Semi-structured Interview Questions
Asset Category Independent Questions: Part I
1. Can you please tell us how many unique PINs you cur-
rently use?
2. Which resources do those PINs protect? For ATM
cards, does the PIN protect one or multiple ATM cards?
[Participants were reminded of some assets that are
commonly protected by a PIN. The list included ATM
cards, smartphones, laptops, personal computers, on-
line accounts, electronic home locks, home security
systems, garage door openers, cars, bike/gym locks,
voicemail, gaming consoles, apps, smartwatches, ther-
mostats, and other home devices.]
3. Did you miss any PINs previously? What resources do
they protect?
Asset Category Dependent Questions
The following questions were repeated for each of the three
PIN categories (digital, nancial, and physical). Context-
dependent questions were for the most frequently used PIN
in each category, unless otherwise noted.
1. Who else have you shared this PIN with? If friends or
roommates, how many?
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2. How concerned would you be if your PIN was re-
vealed to the following people: (5-point Likert scale
“Very concerned”– “Not concerned at all” )
(a) Friends, (b) Roommates, (c) Parents, (d) Siblings, (e)
Spouses, (f) Children
3. How long have you been using this PIN?
4. Have you ever changed a PIN in this category in the
past? If so, what prompted it?
5. [IF CHANGED PIN] What are your strategies for
changing a PIN and picking a new PIN?
6. Can you rank how important the security of this as-
set is you? (5-point Likert scale “Very important”– “Not
important at all” )
7. When picking the PIN, what was the order of impor-
tance for the following criteria: (a) memorability; (b)
ease of usability; (c) security; (d) reuse of a previous
PIN
8. How often do you enter a PIN for this category?
9. (For any asset in this category) Has there ever been
a situation where someone learned your PIN? If so,
who? How did they learn it? What device? What was
your recourse? If the PIN was not updated, why?
10. (For any asset in this category) Have you ever been
in a situation where you were worried about someone
observing your PIN? What was your recourse?
11. (For any asset in this category) Have you ever been
in a situation where you were worried about someone
may try guessing your PIN? What was your recourse?
12. (For any asset in this category) Have you ever shared
a PIN with someone in the past that you are no longer
in a relationship with? If so, who? [Examples include
past spouses, friends, coworkers, and roommates]
13. [IF SHARED WITH PAST RELATIONSHIPS] Did
you take any steps to ensure that such people no
longer have access to your PIN protected resources?
What steps did you take, and why?
14. Have you ever tried to learn or observe a PIN of some-
one? How? Was it successful? What resource were
you trying to access? Was it someone you knew?
15. If we ask you to guess the PIN of a person you know
in ve guesses, what strategies will you take?
16. Would your strategies for the above question change
if it was a stranger?
17. (For any asset in this category) Do you store or write
PINs anywhere, like a notepad or online password
manager? If you write them on a notepad, where do
you store it?
Asset Category Independent Questions: Part II
1. Have you ever used the same PIN for two or more
devices? How about devices that are in dierent
classes?
2. Consider a digital device you use to login to your bank-
ing website/app or your digital wallets like Apple Pay
or Google Pay. Is this device protected using a PIN (in-
cluding PIN backup for ngerprint? If so, does access
to your banking website or your digital wallets require
another PIN or a password?
3. How were the physical PINs to home or garage
access were setup? [Did they set them up? Did
they updated them when they moved to a new
place? Did a technician set them up? Did the pre-
vious owner set them up or is it the default PIN?
If the previous owner set up the garage door PIN,
did they change key locks? If so, why not other PINs?]
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